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INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY FOR BREAKFAST:
MARKET POWER AND INFORMATIVE SYMBOLS
IN THE MARKETPLACE
P. SEAN MORRIS*
ABSTRACT
This Article continues to examine an important question: are trademarks a source
of market power, or, put differently, when are trademarks an antitrust problem? This
fundamental question is a cause of division among antitrust and intellectual property
law scholars. However, by raising the question and presenting some scenarios that can
provide answers, my hope is that contemporary antitrust and intellectual property
scholars can explore some of its implications. As part of my own quest to address this
question, I explore the proposition that creative deception and the wealth-generating
capacity of trademarks are unorthodox elements that actually contribute to allegations
of monopolistic behavior through product differentiation. This article is organized in
three major sections in addition to introductory and concluding observations. In Part
Two, I discuss the concept of creative deception and argue that through trademarking
activities creative deception helps to sustain market power. In Part Three, I offer a
comparative analysis of market power in different intellectual property regimes such
as patents, copyrights, and trademarks. However, I examine a few case studies where
allegedly market power emerged as a result of creative deception and trademarking
activities. I examine, in particular, the Cereal complaints that the FTC addressed in
the 1970s. Part Four of the Article offers a more systematic discussion on creative
deception through three market dynamics: (a) trademarks as promoting competition,
(b) trademarks as wealth generating tools, and (c) trademarks in product
differentiation. These dynamics, I argue, bring us closer to view creative deception
and trademarking activities as evidence that requires greater scrutiny under antitrust
law.
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arguments are different.

36

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2019

1

2019]

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY FOR BREAKFAST

37

E. Do Trademarks Contribute to Innovation? ......................................... 43
III.

MARKET POWER IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS ........................... 44
A. Copyrights and Market Power ............................................................ 46
B. Patents and Market Power .................................................................. 47
C. Trademarks and Market Power: Any Lessons from the Breakfast Cereal
(Brands) Complaint? ............................................................................... 48

IV.

TRADEMARKS, HOMO ECONOMICUS AND THE FIRM ................................. 50
A. Trademarks and the Promotion of Competition .................................. 50
B. The Economics of Trademarks and Their Wealth Generatin Capacity55
C. Product Differentiation as Trademarking Activities ........................... 67

V.

CONCLUSION ............................................................................................ 72

I. INTRODUCTION
Are trademarks a source of market power?1 In order to properly answer such a
question, a number of factors and angles must be incorporated into the discussion.
This Article is one such line of argument from the perspective of economic theory on
competitive markets, product differentiation, and a case law discussion which supports
the notion that trademarks are a source of market power.
Based on the above question, a number of related questions also arise. For
example, how strong is the current monopoly theory of trademarks? What is the nature
of the presumption of market power in trademarks and how does it affect antitrust
laws? Market power, as is understood in antitrust law, is the ability to raise and sustain
prices above the competitive market. Trademarks play a crucial role in acquiring
market power by means of trademarking activities such as product differentiation or
brand extension, and firms that enjoy significant market power can also effectively
restrain competition.
The debate on trademarks as monopolies saw its zenith from the late 1930s through
the early 1950s (mostly in American legal scholarship) and then took a nosedive.
Perhaps the strongest factor for its resurrection in recent years can be attributed to
Glynn Lunney’s treatment of the topic in 1999 and subsequent sporadic discussion by
other scholars.2 The courts have also struggled with the question of trademarks as
monopolies for more than three centuries, indicating that such a question cannot be
simply brushed under the rug; rather, the question must be looked at for its broader
1 See generally P. Sean Morris, The Economics of Distinctiveness: The Road to
Monopolization in Trade Mark Law, 33 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 321 (2011); P. Sean
Morris, Trademarks as Sources of Market Power: Drugs, Beers and Product Differentiation,
35 J.L. & COM. 163 (2017); P. Sean Morris, Trademarks as Sources of Market Power: Legal
and Historical Encounters, 38 LIV. L. REV. 159 (2017).
2 Glynn Lunney Jr., Trademark Monopolies, 48 EMORY L.J. 367 (1999). But see William
Landes & Richard Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective, 30 J.L. & ECON. 265
(1987).
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implication within antitrust law.
In this Article, I will focus on the market power theory in intellectual property
cases, such as patent and copyrights and the antitrust connection. The Article also
investigates a complaint involving trademarks and the presumption of market power
with the overall goal of capturing “a unified theoretical framework to estimate market
power”3 when trademarking activities are employed in goods and services. The Article
is part of a three-part series examining trademarks as sources of market power that I
hope can ultimately revisit the debate or shine more light on the matter.4
Primarily used as signals to identify the origin of goods where several competitors
position themselves for the purchasing power of consumers, trademarks are the
undisputed champions of such economic space. As a means of identifying product
source, trademarks serve an important economic function in that they convey to
consumers the origin of goods and other information associated with the goods, such
as quality and reputation of the economic entity that produces the goods. One
particular element of trademarks that evades commentators is their creative deception,
which not only entices vulnerable consumers but also serves as one of the underlying
elements in creating market power in trademarked goods. As I shall argue in the next
section, creative deception is a form of trademarking activity that preys on the
vulnerability of consumer psychology whereby a trademark signals both desirability
(socially optimal) and monopolistic behavior (market retention) through product
differentiation.
II. CREATIVE DECEPTION AND THE NATURE OF TRADEMARKS IN COMPETITIVE
MARKETS
A. Trademarks as the Ultimate Intangible Property
Trademarks have long been associated with economic enterprising. In both ancient
and medieval times, man used symbols or stellar mythos to identify his livestock.
Similarly, modern man as an economic entity (homo economicus) also informs his
neighbor that his livestock are stamped with a certain sign, or, that sign as a symbol
that the processed meat originated from his neighbor’s livestock.
As modern trademarks developed from the late nineteenth century to present times
due to the number of laws that were enacted, a trademark became to be seen as the
ultimate intangible property and the very symbol of competitive markets that
flourished from the turn of the twentieth century. But modern trademarks have since
moved beyond using signs to more fanciful signs that are capable of graphic
representation that includes a mixture of words, sounds, or smells to mark territorial
borders in the market economy.
For modern rightsholders, trademarks are powerful symbols that determine how
effective a market function is, given that, trademarks serve as the gatekeeper to quality,
status, originality, and consumer behaviors. Beyond one of their essential functions of
identifying the source of goods, trademarks are also economic entities in their own
right that serve the wealth creating process, in particular for the rightsholders of
trademarks.
In modern competitive markets, trademarks are constantly on a charm offensive to
3 ROBERT STEINER, PRIVATE LABELS, BRANDS, AND COMPETITION POLICY: THE CHANGING
LANDSCAPE OF RETAIL COMPETITION 73 (Ariel Ezrachi & Ulf Bernitz eds., 2009).
4

See supra note 1.
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win the hearts and minds of the ‘average consumer,’5 while at the same time cementing
their status as an infinite good due to their exclusivity. This dual complexion of
trademarks suggests that trademarks are complex economic entities that offer a
consumer enhancing effect on the one hand, and a form of barrier to entry on the other.
Trademarks distinguish themselves from other forms of intellectual property rights
due to their fluidity and omnipresence which is largely due to the infinite perpetuation
of a trademark. This infinite perpetuation is derived from the exclusivity in the mark
which becomes an inherent form of monopoly.
B. Trademarks Infinity: “WONDER GREEN PILL”
The infinite perpetuation theory can be demonstrated with the hypothetical wonder
green pill, which, when taken by a male,6 gives him the momentum for endurance in
certain physical activities. The wonder green pill, in this scenario, is covered by all the
major intellectual property rights in broad terms: patent, trade secret, copyright to a
lesser extent, and trademark. The patent of the wonder green pill will lapse after a
certain number of years, normally within twenty, whilst the inventor (patentee) may
never have to reveal his secret formula and the copyright will span his lifetime (plus
almost another century).
These forms of intellectual property rights in the wonder green pill are on a time
continuum in the sense that they last a specific period of time. However, the trademark
does not fall into this category because, upon renewal, it lasts the lifetime of the
wonder green pill when placed on the market. Furthermore, it is the trademark of the
wonder green pill—WONDER GREEN PILL—that creates: (a) the market for wonder
green pills; (b) the reputation of the original manufacturer; (c) the goodwill; (d) the
core asset of Wonder Green Pill, Inc.; (e) the investment leverage of Wonder Green
Pill, Inc.; and (f) its wealth generating machine. This creates an infinite perpetuation
of the trademark and how it operates in a competitive market amongst various knock
offs of wonder green pills with similar “wonderness.” The effect here is that
trademarks not only lead to social optimality, but also carve out a piece of history, in
that, they often retain some form of infinite association to business and create an aura
of stellar mythos.
C. Trademarks Infinity: Beers, Carbonated Drinks, Hams and Market Dynamism
If symbols of the stellar mythos were perhaps some of the world’s oldest signs, 7
5 For a discussion of the concept of the average consumer in the European context, see Jennifer
Davis, Locating the Average Consumer: His Judicial Origins, Intellectual Influences and
Current Role in European Trade Mark Law, 2005 (2) Intellectual Property Quarterly 183.
6 To be fair to the opposite sex – when this article was originally written – there were no
female “wonder green pill”, however, nowadays, the US FDA (and by virtue globally) has since
2015 approved a female version of “wonder green pill”. See Andrew Pollack, F.D.A. Approves
Addyi, a Libido Pill for Women, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18, 2015 at B1.
7 ALBERT CHURCHWARD, THE SIGNS AND SYMBOLS OF PRIMORDIAL MAN: THE EVOLUTION OF
RELIGIOUS DOCTRINES FROM THE ESCHATOLOGY OF THE ANCIENT EGYPTIANS 196 (2d ed. 1913)
(observing that the ancient man developed several mythos, such as stellar, lunar and solar using
symbols, and, as such, we (modern man) should “appreciate the knowledge of all our signs and
symbols, etc..”); see also FRANK SCHECHTER, THE HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW
RELATING TO TRADEMARKS 17–19 (1925) (discussing guilds).
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then, in a modern way, or at least since society has been organized around capitalist
ideals at the turn of the twentieth century, then one of the oldest commercial
trademarks still in existence is that of the red triangle of Bass Ale in the United
Kingdom8 or that most ubiquitous COCA-COLA, a mark created by a supposedly
broke pharmo-entrepreneur, John Pemberton, in the late 1880s for carbonated drinks.9
Another contender for the oldest trademark in the Western world is
WEIHENSTEPHANER.10 The mark was used by German monks in the middle ages
for beers produced in their monastery and nowadays owned by the Bavarian State
Brewery Weihenstephan.
Certainly, there are other contenders both in the West and Far East, or Persia for
that matter. Furthermore, other “old modern” commercial trademarks exist in various
countries. These range from a Pine Tree Logo in Australia11 to an Eagle for condensed
milk in Hong Kong12 to the Bass famous red triangle for beers in the U.K.13
In the U.S., some of the oldest registered trademarks in continuous use include
DEVILED HAMS,14 which went to the William Underwood Company of Boston in
1868/1870,15 and is generally known as the “Red Devil” due to the ontological nature
of the trademark. Other U.S. trademarks notable for their early registration and still in
use include SAMSON for ropes, cords, or lines and QUAKER for oats.
There is one noticeable feature about the contenders for the oldest trademark. Most
have a connection with beer/ale and/or other forms of alchemist drinks, such as CocaCola, or food related items.16
But whichever trademark claims the coveted spot of being the oldest trademark
still in commercial operation, there is no denying the fact that trademarks are
commercial tools essential for market functions and help to distinguish one producer
from another in a competitive market.
Because of man’s basic needs, such as food, water, and other social necessities,
8
Bass & Co. Ale entered UK’s trade mark registry on January 1, 1876, laying claim as the
oldest registered trademark. See BASS & CO. ALE, UK Trademark No.UK00000000001.
9 Bartow J. Elmore, Citizen Coke: An Environmental and Political History of the Coca-Cola
Company, 14 ENTER. & SOC’Y 717–31 (2013).
10

JOHN PARKES, HOME BREWING: SELF-SUFFICIENCY 12 (2009) (noting that Benedictine
Abbey lay claim to be the oldest beer brewery in the world: “The oldest operating commercial
brewery is the Weihenstephan Abbey in Bavaria, which obtained the brewing rights from the
nearby town of Freising in 1040.”).
11

Registered under the 1905 Commonwealth Trade Marks Act, Act No. 20 of 1905, which
provided a uniform trademark law for Australia the first time. See Adriana Casati et al., Early
Trademark Legislation Around the World–Part I, 57 INTA BULLETIN 17 (Sept. 15, 2002).
12

Id.

13

Id.

14 Teagan Schweitzer, Deviled Ham, in THE OXFORD ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF FOOD AND DRINK IN
AMERICA 621 (Andrew Smith ed., 2 ed. 2013).
15

808 Off. Gaz. Pat. Office at 107 (Nov. 17, 1964).

16 The third paper in this series that I have written uses branded beers as empirical evidence
from the U.S. market to similarly argue that trademarks are a source of market power. See
Drugs, Beers and Product Differentiation, supra note 1, at 163.
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various creative individuals, such as John Pemberton and others, would turn raw
material into processed items and create a ready market for such goods. However,
where one lead is created, so is a follower or infringer. Thus, the market for process
goods expands.
In order for the original manufacturer to distinguish his goods from followers, his
mark creates a balance in the market, yet it develops into a dual complexion. In this
scenario, the duality of a trademark is to retain the market for the goods that the
trademarks identify and also, a form of creative deception of consumers' psychology,
where a trademark that indicates origin or quality is socially optimal.
Markets react to the social optimality of consumer behavior given that, in the long
term, the average consumer’s purchasing power increases and, as such, leads to
increased output for goods bearing trademarks based on origin and quality. But an
increased output in goods from a single source creates two scenarios–one negative and
one positive. The first is that of price, where pricing remains constant or slowly leads
upwards and, thus, has a negative effect on the consumer. The second scenario is
market dynamism which creates a positive effect on the market on a whole, making it
more competitive.
The result of this positive effect leads to other spillovers, such as the entry of
competitors with cheaper goods, but not necessarily higher quality, and an option for
secondary consumers to benefit from the less pricey trademarked goods. Here,
consumers are able to escape the creative deception often employed by the trademark
owner in the original good for the less pricey goods. But the cost of this duality in
trademark goods is that it creates a hierarchy of consumers—main consumers and
secondary consumers. But further dynamism in the market where more than two
players are able to compete for the hearts and minds of the consumer can create a loophole for the average consumers, who are then able to choose from a number of goods
whose trademarks indicate their source.
D. Consumers and Creative Deception
When a new trademark comes into existence, its creation is a signal about the
commercial dynamism of the market, but nevertheless, the market’s competitive
equilibrium is disrupted. The nature of this competitive equilibrium can be equated to
what the Supreme Court referred to as “commercial magnetism”17 because, under most
circumstances, the new entrant to the market was attracted by the reputation that the
senior trademark built over time, and also, the new entrant is driven by the desire to
create wealth for himself.
The entry of new competitors into a dynamic market allows for the trademark
owners to use their new trademarks not only to signal the origin of the goods, but it is
also an opportunity for the new entrants to use the trademark to convey to the average
consumer of an improved but affordable product. The goal of a new competitor is to
successfully convince the average consumer of the attributes in his trademark. If this
is achieved, then the dynamism of an even more competitive market suggests that a
trademark’s role is moving beyond the source and origin functions to that which also
include creative deception because of its ability to persuade the average consumer on

17 Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S. S. Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 203, 205 (1942). See
also Frank Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARV. L. REV. 813, 820
(1927).
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the nature of the product. But this does not mean that only those consumers who are
labeled as average are susceptible to the creative deception of trademarks. In fact, all
consumers including the main and secondary consumers are susceptible to the creative
deception of trademarks in a competitive market. This is because consumers exercise
a great deal of savviness and flexibility when shopping and the signals that are
conveyed to them via trademarks are interpreted in such a manner that they are able
to make their purchasing decisions based on those signals in a trademark.
Creative deception is an artful form typically expressed in trademarks and other
signs that preys on the psychological vulnerability of consumers in persuading them
of the quality and benefits of merchandise. Creative deception does not relate to
contemporary understanding of passing off, misleading, falsifying or other forms of
deceptions generally found in trademark doctrines, such as the U.K.’s common law or
continental Europe’s unfair competition laws.18
Creative deception is a tool of trademarking activity employed in the competitive
market of goods and services in the quest for market share and bottom line profit. 19
Although the quest for quality could also be a goal in creative deception, it is often not
the underlying reason for creative deception, since the original goods that are
represented by a trademark often retain a leading position over competitors or new
product lines employ existing trademarks due to reputation and quality. An example
would be Coca-Cola Classic and New Coke, where the latter used creative deception
to drive profitability and competitors to the margins and, thus, retained its lead on the
consumer market for specialized carbonated beverages. 20 Creative deception in
trademarking activities can also be linked to brand extension (a topic I discussed
extensively elsewhere). 21
The incentives for trademark owners to engage in creative deception are not hard
to discern since creative deception drives profitability. But the exclusivity afforded by
trademark laws allows for the practice of creative deception since a trademark or brand
which is a result of creative deception is linked to the original trademark where the
trademark owner enjoys exclusivity. A trademark owner cannot infringe his own
trademark, however, a competitor, who engages in creative deception and tries to
make a link to the competitor’s original mark, can infringe the competitor’s mark.
18

Id.

19

Greg Lastowka, The Trademark Function of Authorship, 85 B.U. L. REV. 1171, 1218
(2005).
20 The Real Story of New Coke, THE COCA-COLA COMPANY (Nov. 14, 2012),
https://www.coca-colacompany.com/stories/coke-lore-new-coke.
21

See Drugs, Beers and Product Differentiation, supra note 1. Courts are sometimes known
to treat trademarks similar to brands. See, e.g., O2 Holdings Ltd. v. Hutchison 3G Ltd. [2006]
EWHC (Ch) 534 [4] (Eng.) (“Defining a brand is not easy. A lawyer would tend to think of
goodwill, trade marks and so on.”); SIDNEY LEVY, BRANDS, CONSUMERS, SYMBOLS & RESEARCH
143–44 (1999) (“[A] trademark is a brand or part of a brand that is given protection because it
is capable of exclusive appropriation.”). See also Jennifer Davis, Between a Sign and a Brand:
Mapping the Boundaries of a Registered Trade Mark in European Union Trade Mark Law, in
TRADE MARKS AND BRANDS: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY CRITIQUE 65 (Lionel Bently et al. eds.,
2008); TRADEMARKS, BRANDS, AND COMPETITIVENESS (Teresa da Silva Lopes & Paul Duguid
eds., Routledge 2010); P. Sean Morris, Guess What Gucci?: Post-Sale Confusion Exists in
Europe, 47 VAL. U. L. REV. 1, 50 (2012); David Tan, Differentiating Between Brand and Trade
Mark: City Chain v. Louis Vuitton Malletier, SING. J. LEGAL STUD. 202 (2010).
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The broader implication of creative deception on consumers does not necessarily
cause consumer confusion; rather, creative deception creates scenarios where
consumers are loyal to original brands and any derivative of those brands by means of
creative deception. Furthermore, the quality of goods that result from creative
deception are perceived through the information that is conveyed via the creative
deceptive mark, which is linked to the original mark and as such also about the brand
the creative deceptive mark portrayed.
There are, however, two broader implications of trademarking activities by
creative deception. First is the creation of a larger market share for the rightsholder’s
goods as a result of the original trademark. As such, the possibility of abusing that
market share increases. The second is that of driving monopoly profits of the
rightsholder and thus relegating trademarks to another function–that of wealth
generation (see below). The nature of creative deception in trademarks is, in a sense,
part of the discussion on the wealth generating function of trademarks but because
creative deception in trademarks is an emerging theme, it should also form part of the
wider debate on whether trademarks contribute to any form of innovation.
E. Do Trademarks Contribute to Innovation?
A trademark is not generally considered to be part of the innovative process, given
that, unlike patents, there is nothing innovative about trademarks.22 But I beg to differ
and posit that trademarks are indeed innovative (creative in a broad sense) and
contribute to the innovation process. Trademarks’ contribution to the innovation
process stems from that fact that trademarks are an intellectual component of the
goods they bear and therefore improve the desirability and attributes of such goods
that create more competition in the dynamic market which is driven by trademark’s
creative deception and consumer purchasing power. If a market is competitive, then
such competitiveness is an acknowledgment of the role trademarks play, since their
innovative role helps to maximize the welfare of all consumers and leads to more
efficiency in the market.23
Even if we should cast aside the innovative or efficiency arguments when framing
the nature of trademarks in a competitive market, other market mechanisms such as
pricing and profitability or the retention of market share have allowed a surge in the
expansion of trademarks in particular, through methods such as trademark extension
via brands (themes not taken up in this Article), a noticeable trait in the beer/ale and
carbonated drinks industry. As competition in the market increases, other practices
also contribute to how a trademark is perceived by both the consuming public and the
regulatory authorities. In the first instance, trademark laws were seen as a response to
some of the direct practices and methods that plagued competitive markets. In other
words, trademark laws were seen as curtailing market freedoms where trademarks sole
function was to drive competition. And, in the other instance, those same laws were
against the spirit of the free market.24
Due to the world of competitive markets in which goods, ideas, innovation, and
profitability are the driving forces, trademark laws were a response to those behaviors
22 But see Dayoung Chung, Laws, Brands, and Innovation: How Trademark Law Helps to
Create Fashion Innovation, 17 J. Marshall Rev. Intell. Prop. L. 493 (2018) (discussing designs).
23

Ralph H. Folsom & Larry L. Teply, Trademark Generic Words, 89 YALE L.J 1323 (1980).

24

Schechter, supra note 17, at 813.
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in order to prevent consumer confusion in such competitive markets. In other words,
the competitive market, of which trademarks are the unique identifier of goods and
services, had become hostile to the consumers whose hearts and minds they were/are
chasing, since the creative deception of trademarks causes a state of confusion in those
consumers. One likely broader implication of creative deception is the retaining and
gaining of market power.
III. MARKET POWER IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
The essence of the market power inquiry in this Article is whether it can be
acquired illegally by intellectual property rights that will offend the antitrust laws. I
am not concerned about natural market power or those of a “historic accident” 25 by
nature or, as a result of, a grant in the intellectual property.
If intellectual property rights are used to acquire market power illegally, 26 does
that market power violate antitrust law? This question is investigated in this section.
In Eastman Kodak v. Image Technical Services,27 the Court acknowledged that market
power arises as a result of “the ability of a single seller to raise price and restrict
output.”28 The question of market power in intellectual property rights has been at the
heart of antitrust and the intersection of intellectual property rights.29 This notion
arises primarily because of the presumption that the exclusivity in intellectual property
rights confers market power. This presumption was addressed in Illinois Tool Works,
where that Court held that evidence was required to prove the existence of market
power in patent tying arrangements and there was not the presumption of market
power per se.30 This is good for other areas of intellectual property rights such as
trademarks, since based on the Illinois Tool Works decision, there is no need to
presume that the exclusivity in trademark protection should be used to confer market
power.
At the same time, if this argument is turned in the opposite direction by looking at
evidence, then arguably, the factors that determine market power, and if such market
power potentially violates antitrust law, should be based on hardcore evidence and
data to realistically determine the acquisition of market power.31 But the Illinois Tool
25 United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 571 (1966) (“The offence of monopoly under
§ 2 of the Sherman Act has two elements: (1) the possession of monopoly power in the relevant
market and (2) the wilful acquisition or maintenance of that power as distinguished from growth
or development as a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic accident.”).
26 Handbook of U.S. Antitrust Sources, 2012 ABA SEC. ANTITRUST L. 258–59 (“If a patent or
other form of intellectual property does confer market power, that market power does not by
itself offend the antitrust laws. …[M]arket power could be illegally acquired or maintained, or,
even if lawfully acquired and maintained, would be relevant to the ability of an intellectual
property owner to harm competition through unreasonable conduct in connection with such
property.”).
27

504 U.S. 451 (1992).

28

Id. at 464 (citing Fortner Enters., Inc. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 503 (1969)).

29

Ariel Katz, Making Sense of Nonsense: Intellectual Property, Antitrust, and Market Power,
49 ARIZ. L. REV. 837, 839 (2007).
30

Ill. Tool Works, Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (Ill. 2006).

31

See also Drugs, Beers and Product Differentiation, supra note 1.
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Works decision was uniquely patent and also touched upon other areas of intellectual
property rights, such as copyrights and trademarks, whereas, these latter two have a
complex and unique approach to assessing market power.32 This is due to the number
of factors to be taken into account, and how those factors are interpreted and analyzed
in the other main body of law which is uniquely important—antitrust law.33
Prior to Illinois Tool Works, the presumption that market power automatically
exists where there is the conferment of copyrights and patents (trademarks are a
different category) had been rejected in some lower courts in the United States. 34 Some
courts were quick to discard the presumption that market power exists in intellectual
property rights. For example, in Root v. Computer Dynamics,35 the court rejected the
notion of “absolute presumption of market power for copyrighted or patented
products.”36 The judgment in Illinois Tool Works would do away with such a per se
presumption and shift the dynamics in assessing market power in intellectual property
rights. There is a silver lining in Illinois Tool Works for the market power analysis in
trademarks. The decision supports the thesis that if evidence is gathered that shows
that trademarks are tools for obtaining market power and that that market power has
been used in an anticompetitive way, then trademarks serve as sources of market
power and, furthermore, trademarks promotes product differentiation–it is the use of
the market power in violation of the antitrust rules that makes trademarks, the bad guy,
so to speak.
Market power in intellectual property ought to be justified. Certainly if a drug
company were to create a new wonder pill for erectile impulses and obtain intellectual
property protection for various aspects of the pill—this does not mean that there is an
automatic demand for the new pill, simply because the new pill is covered by patents,
copyrights, or trademarks. If one of the potent secrets of the new wonder pill would
be the ability to heighten a male’s impetus for encounters with another person, 37 the
creators would then be able to control all aspects of how the pill is distributed and
sold. A market would be created, whereas, the manufacturers of the new wonder pill
would be able to command a monopoly position on the market for heightened
encounters. Thus earning super normal profits for the creators, however temporary
that may be.
Intellectual property protection creates market power for the product in question—
however, this does not mean that the mere existence of market power is a breach of
antitrust law.38 What the existence of market power tells us is that there is a need to
gather the evidence in order to demonstrate that such existence creates a willingness

32

Ill. Tool Works, 547 U.S. at 45.

33

Id. at 31.

34

A.I. Root Co. v. Computer Dynamics, Inc, 806 F.2d 673, 676 (6th Cir. 1986).

35

Id.

36

Id. at 676.

37

See also my disclaimer at supra note 6.

38 Va. Panel Corp. v. MAC Panel Co., 133 F.3d 860, 872 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“[V]iolation of the
antitrust laws always requires …market power in a defined relevant market (which may be
broader than that defined by the patent) . . .”).
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to abuse that power at the expense of the consuming public. 39
A. Copyrights and Market Power
As with the many questions that this Article raises about market power, one
pertinent area of intellectual property rights that plays a critical role is copyrights. Do
copyrights confer market power? This section merely alludes to the issue and does not
argue the many intrinsic details pertaining to this question.
It is worth noting that copyright protection traverses complex areas of protection,
whether it be an author’s work, databases, collecting societies, software programming
among others, and discussing market power or even antitrust in the area of copyright
would also require a dissection of those many areas before a true and accurate picture
of market power in the copyright context can be confirmed. Nevertheless, on a few
occasions, the courts have confirmed the existence of market power in copyrighted
products, and hence, was liable under antitrust law. In Data General v. Digidyne,40 the
Supreme Court noted that consumers were “locked in” to the product in question and
“viewed the copyright . . . as creating a presumption of market power.”41 This passage
alone from the court’s decision raises two possible antitrust harms. The first harm
under antitrust analysis would be the “locked in” scenario, where consumers are
locked in to a product or services. The second antitrust implication is that of actual
market power. A finding of market power would determine how that power was used
to violate the antitrust rules.
In the competitive economy where ideas and the protections by copyrights and
other intellectual property have become paramount, the pressing concern from an
antitrust perspective is how copyright misuse affects the market. 42 For example, in
Saturday Evening Post Co. v. Rumbleseat, Inc.,43 the court explained that contractual
restrictions could be used as instruments that may give rise to monopoly power beyond
that is already protected under the copyright, and therefore, would be a violation of
antitrust law.44
Unlike trademarks, copyright protection shares certain kinds of traits with patents,

39

See Drugs, Beers and Product Differentiation, supra note 1.

40

473 U.S. 908 (1985).

Id. at 909 (“[T]his case raises several substantial questions of antitrust law and policy,
including . . . whether market power over ‘locked in’ customers must be analyzed at the outset
of the original decision to purchase, and what effect should be given to the existence of a
copyright or other legal monopoly in determining market power.”).
41

42 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 439 (1984); Lasercomb
Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 976 (4th Cir. 1990); In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust
Litig., 964 F. Supp. 1469, 1477 (D. Kan. 1997) (noting that “[a]n alleged infringer can establish
copyright misuse by showing either that (1) the defendant violated the antitrust laws, or (2) the
defendant illegally extended its monopoly beyond the scope of the copyright or violated the
public policies underlying the copyright laws.”).
43

816 F.2d 1191, 1199 (7th Cir. 1987) (discussing a no contest clause).

44

For a discussion on some European developments in the early 2000s where contractual
restrictions were also a concern in legislations see P. Sean Morris, Grant-Backs and No
Challenge Clauses in Europe: What Lessons from the MedImmune v. Genentech Case, 31
World Competition 113 (2008).
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and thus copyright protection is presumed to include market power.45 The exclusivity
in the patent or copyright, for the duration of the protected term, allows the right
holders to become monopolists. But there is a rational reason for such exclusivity.
Copyright, like patents, serves to promote innovation and creativity in the
marketplace.46 This goal is also one that antitrust law pursues, by limiting actions that
distort or monopolize the competitive process—so that creators, authors and inventors
can reap some form of economic benefit.47 The challenge that the intellectual property
system and the antitrust system face is how to reconcile those two forms of conflicting
goals—for the better good of a more competitive economic space.
B. Patents and Market Power
Patents have always had a special place at the intersection of intellectual property
law and antitrust law. The very notion of intellectual property could easily be
substituted for patents, whenever such a discussion is raised. This is also evident by
the voluminous case law and literature on the subject—the majority of which revolve
around patents.48 But my purpose is to merely alert the reader’s awareness on the
nature of patents and market power. Any substantial discussions require, at minimum,
a monograph.
In rulings such as Illinois Tool Works, the Supreme Court has erected a more
cautious wall towards holding that the presumption of market power in patent tying
arrangements are illegal per se, and argued that the burden of proof is on the plaintiff
to demonstrate that a defendant has market power by producing evidence to that
assumption.49 Simply assuming that market power exists due to the grant of a patent
was no longer enough. In fact, Illinois Tool Works has implications for other areas of
intellectual property law, including trademarks. One such implication is the conduct
of market power in franchising agreements, as per Siegel v. Chicken Delight.50 But
aside from Illinois Tool Works, other classic cases, such as Jefferson Parish,51,
Qualitex52 and Loew’s53 have all contributed to the legal approach of market power in
patents.
In the last few years, as a result of the peaceful coexistence of antitrust law and
intellectual property law—patent law in particular—the question of market power in
patents is no longer a dreaded situation. The decision in Illinois Tool Works reflects
45

Aaron Fellmeth, Copyright Misuse and the Limits of the Intellectual Property Monopoly, 6
J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 9–10 (1999); Hanna Ramsey, Misusing Antitrust: The Search for
Functional Copyright Misuse Standards, 46 STAN. L. REV. 401, 413–14 (1994).
46

Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc. 510 U.S. 517, 527 (1994).

47

Id. at 526.

48 See also Warren Lavey, Patents, Copyrights, and Trademarks as Sources of Market Power
in Antitrust Cases, 27 Antitrust Bulletin 433 (1982).
49

Ill. Tool Works, Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 46 (2006).

50

448 F.2d 43, 49–50 (9th Cir. 1971).

51

See Jefferson Par. Hosp. Dist. v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984).

52

See Qualitex Co. v Jacobson, 514 U.S. 159 (1995).

53

See United States v. Loew’s Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962).
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this. Much debate remains on the extent of market power in intellectual property, such
as trademarks, and I concur with the Court in Illinois Tool Works with the producing
of evidence to demonstrate market power.54 This is even more relevant for trademarks
(and in another paper where I use the U.S. beer industry as an example, the evidence
is somewhat convincing).55
A word of caution is warranted. The difficult task of developing and analyzing
evidence in relation to market power does not mean that the desired outcome will be
that market power will actually be demonstrated, however, what the task itself can
demonstrate is that even with the evidence—this does not necessarily mean that
market power exists. Thus, patents, which have the shortest protection period when
compared to copyrights and trademarks, are essential to the innovation and
competitiveness of an economy, and the attainment of market power by patented
products could actually be a good thing for an economy.
C. Trademarks and Market Power: Any Lessons from the Breakfast Cereal
(Brands) Complaint?
In 1972, the FTC filed a complaint against a number of breakfast cereal
producers.56 The FTC complained that cereal manufactures were engaged in practices
that maintained a highly concentrated non-competitive market structure for ready-toeat cereals. The companies named in the complaint were producers of ready-to-eat
(RTE) breakfast cereals.57 Several other companies such as Nabisco and Purina were
named but not as respondents. The FTC alleged that the five cereal manufacturers
were violating Section 5 of the FTC Act. 58 In the complaint, the FTC claimed that
“competition has been hindered, lessened and eliminated” in the RTE market,
resulting in a non-competitive market structure.59
One particular allegation by the FTC against the RTE producers stood out: “brand
proliferation, product differentiation, and trademark promotion.”60 This allegation is
significant because it captured the essence and core of the theory on trademark as
sources of market power. The FTC developed two theses for brand proliferation,
production differentiation and trademark promotion: the first was barriers to entry and
the second was advertising expenditures.61 The third aspect on trademark promotion
was incorporated under the allegation of “unfair methods of competition in advertising
54

See Ill. Tool Works, 547 U.S. at 46.

55

See Drugs, Beers and Product Differentiation, supra note 1.

56 The Cereal Case: Opening Shot in FTC War on Structural Shared-Monopoly or Attack on
Marketing Irregularities, 5 ANTITRUST L. & ECON. REV. 71, 75 (1971) [hereinafter Cereal Case]
(reprinting of FTC’s complaint against the cereal industry, including Kellogg Company,
General Mills, Inc., General Food Corporation, and the Quaker Oats Company).
57 Id. at 75–76 (defining RTE as: “food products made from barley, corn, oats, rice or wheat
and various combinations of such grains which are flaked, granulated, puffed, shredded or
processed in other ways. RTE cereals are eaten primarily as a breakfast food requiring little or
no preparation by the consumer.”).
58

Id. at 75.

59

Id. at 79.

60

Id.

61

Id. at 80.
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and product promotion.”62 It is the allegation on brand proliferation and production
differentiation which I am mostly concerned with.63 The FTC complaint, after almost
a decade of investigation, was dismissed in 1982.64 However, because the complaint
was a Section 5 complaint, dealing with deception and unfairness and would not
necessarily violate antitrust law, the complaint itself was tainted.65 However, the
language and style of the complaint made clear that the FTC wanted to pursue an
antirust claim under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, but such a task would have been
more tedious for the FTC. Part of the FTC’s complaint, which I construe to be strictly
antitrust was the “practices of proliferating brands, differentiating similar products and
promoting trademarks through intensive advertising resulting in high barriers to entry
into the RTE cereal market.”66 The allegations made by the FTC into the cereal
industry effectively uncovered the notion of brand proliferation and their antitrust
effect, in particular when brands are synonymous with trademarks.
The cereal brands complaint raised two interconnected issues that are significant.
The first is the issue of market definition and the market for cereal. The second is the
issue of brand proliferation. On the issue of market definition, or determining the
market for ready-to-eat cereal, the complaint alleged that among themselves, four of
the cereal manufacturers controlled 90 percent of the RTE market by 1970. 67 One of
the key tests in determining market definition and possible violations of antitrust law
is the calculation of market shares.68 The 90 percent market share held by the four

62 Id. at 82 (“These unfair methods of competition have contributed to and enhanced
respondent’s ability to obtain and maintain monopoly prices and to exclude competitors from
the manufacture and sale of RTE cereal.”).
63 Id. at 82–85 (explaining the several other allegations such as: the control of shelf space by
Kellogg; the acquisition of competitors and thereby engaging in monopoly power and
maintaining artificially inflated prices).
64

In re Kellogg Co., 99 F.T.C. 8 (1982).

65

Id. at 265.

66

Cereal Case, supra note 56, at 80.

67

Id. at 79.

68

Jefferson Par. Hosp. Dist. v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 45 (1984).
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manufacturers69 was credible evidence for a finding of market power.70
The second issue of brand proliferation, which is linked to product differentiation,
was predatory in nature. With more than a hundred brands among themselves, and
coordinating for shelf space, the predatory brand proliferation were conduits for
exclusion of new entrants in the RTE market. There are lessons to be learned from the
breakfast cereal. The two most important lessons were largely ignored both by the
courts and the legal academic literature.71 The first is predatory brand proliferations
(again, this issue I take up in a separate paper on the U.S. beer industry) 72 and the
second lesson is that market power can be presumed with trademarks. The rest of this
Article concentrates on the latter in a wider context.
IV. TRADEMARKS, HOMO ECONOMICUS AND THE FIRM
A. Trademarks and the Promotion of Competition
One of my claims in the previous section is that trademarks contribute to the
innovation process, and as controversial as this claim may be, let us assume that this
claim is correct. Thus, if trademarks contribute to the innovation process, what in
broad terms should the innovation process aspire to? I argue that one such aspiration
of the innovation process, for which trademarks are a part of, is the promotion of
competition in a competitive market economy. My reference to competition in this
section is that of rivalry between firms or individuals on a market competing for
consumers using goods or services represented by a trademark or a derivative brand
from a trademark. This is crucial in order to develop my further arguments, and to stay
69

The conventional wisdom is that even nowadays, the big four manufacturers of RTE still
control the RTE market. See Jeffrey J. Reimer & John M. Connor, Market Conduct in the U.S.
Ready-to-Eat Cereal Industry, 1 J. AGRIC. & FOOD INDUS. ORG. 1 (2002) (“Three characteristics
distinguish the U.S. ready-to-eat (RTE) cereal industry. First, the industry is highly
concentrated. Although there are approximately 40 companies producing more than 400 brands,
more than 90% of output since 1980 has been produced by just five companies. Another
characteristic is excessive advertising. Average selling expenses are 30% of sales value, with
smaller firms tending to advertise more than large firms. Moreover, most of this expense is for
mass-media advertising. The third distinguishing characteristic of the RTE cereal industry is
product proliferation. New product launches have increased from one or two products per year
in 1950, to more than 100 per year since 1989. If one accounts for all of the variations in sizes
and flavors of the 400 brands, there are approximately 1000 RTE cereal products for sale in the
U.S. Private label products, an important source of competition in other industries, have limited
effect in the RTE cereal industry. Though they are priced about 40% above private label
products, branded products continuously capture more than 90% of the market.” (citations
omitted)).
70

Aviv Nevo, Measuring Market Power in the Ready-to-Eat Cereal Industry, 69
ECONOMETRICA 307, 310 (2001).
71 But see Barry L. Bayus & William P. Putsis, Jr., Product Proliferation: An Empirical
Analysis of Product Line Determinants and Market Outcomes,18 MKTG. SCI. 137, 138 (1999);
William P. Putsis, Jr., An Empirical Study of the Effect of Brand Proliferation on Private LabelNational Brand Pricing Behavior, 12 REV. INDUS. ORG. 355, 359 (1997); Ruth Raubitschek, A
Model of Product Proliferation with Multiproduct Firms, 35 J. INDUS. ECON. 269, 277 (1987);
Leonard Fong-Sheng Wang & Ya-Chin Wang, Brand Proliferation and Inter-Brand
Competition: The Strategic Role of Transfer Pricing, 35 J. ECON. STUD. 278, 279 (2008); Steffen
Ziss, Divisionalization and Product Differentiation, 59 ECON. LETTERS 133, 136–37 (1998).
72 See Drugs, Beers and Product Differentiation, supra note 1.
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clear of competition that has a linkage to antitrust as that discussion is reserved for
later in this Article. Moreover, the argument that trademarks promote competition,
although slightly raised in the previous sections, offers a more detailed and balanced
view in this section.
Competition in the marketplace for consumer purchasing power using trademarks
(or a brand) promotes the overall interest of society. The competitive market is a place
where goods and services are provided by various individuals and firms using their
unique source of identification–the trademark to lure consumers at a continuous
frequency to those goods and services.73 It is this competition among the varied
players, whether they are firms or individuals, using their trademarks as source
identifiers of goods and services that serve as one of the most important operative
modules in the quest for innovation and the promotion of competition itself. Therefore,
trademarks’ role in this grand game of market competition is fairly obvious. First,
trademarks help consumers identify the source of the goods. Second, trademarks,
when used to identify new and innovative goods on the market, generate more revenue
and offer additional choices to consumers. Third, trademarks, when representing an
existing good, also signals the goodwill investment in that good and thereby can lead
to overall profit for the trademark owners who also maintain or increase their market
share.
As has been seen so far in this Article, the question is whether an increase in market
share can lead to illegal market power and, relatedly, what is the actual role of the
trademark itself in creating illegal market power. In Europe, there are also some
interesting dynamics where trademarks connote antitrust issues. 74 At the federal
European Union Intellectual Property Office—EUIPO—at the end of June 2014, there
were four registered European Union trademarks (EUTM) for the anti-obesity
(slimming pill), Grenade,75 under class five (dietary supplements etc.,) of the Nice
trademark classification system.76 All four word marks– GRENADE; GRENADE
DEFEND; GRENADE RPG and THERMO GRENADE—were owned by a single
U.K. applicant (proprietor) for food and dietary supplements. 77 These four trademarks
are one of the means which the proprietor of these pink pills has in his arsenal in order
to effectively compete in what is a competitive market for dietary supplements. The
proprietor is able to use those trademarks with a blast (no pun intended) to announce
new products on the market for dietary supplements and also at the same time to cater
to the different purchasing power of consumers. In addition, the four trademarks for
73

Nicholas S. Economides, The Economics of Trademarks, 78 TRADEMARK REP. 523, 526
(1988).
74 See Grenade UK Ltd v. Grenade Energy Ltd [2016] EWHC 877 (IPEC) (this case eventually
held as passing off under UK law).
75 EUTM, 005182019; EUTM, 009206574; EUTM, 011827904; EUTM, 012086955, all
owned by Grenade (UK) Ltd. EUR. UNION INTELL. PROP OFF., https://euipo.europa.eu/
eSearch/#details/owners/580204 (last visited Aug. 31, 2019).
76 Nice Agreement Concerning the International Classification of Goods and Services for the
Purposes of the Registration of Marks June 15, 1957 (as revised). Class 5 covers goods and
services to include: healthcare, dietary, herbal and nutritional supplements; preparations and
substances; dietary food supplements; dietary supplemental drinks and shakes.
77

Id.
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dietary supplements also signal that some form of innovation occurred, and the
trademarks are used to differentiate such innovation. And, similar to the magic created
by the utopian wonder green pills mentioned in the previous section, the grenade pink
pills often work magic for individuals seeking a slimmer waistline. For consumers,
then, there is an obvious benefit. But do these pink pills, represented by different
trademarks, actually promote competition?
To justify how competition is promoted by trademarks, when the overall function
of trademark law is to promote competition by protecting the reputation of the firm,
in particular when a firm uses more than one trademark for essentially the same type
of goods, it is possible to argue that, to a large extent, trademarks represent dynamic
efficiency. In other words, in a dynamic market, trademarks serve as incentives for the
efficient production of goods by a single proprietor, which in turn also signals to
competitors to enter the market. This incentive for competitors to enter the market
would be a direct result of trademarking activities where four or more trademarks are
used by a single owner for the same type of goods. Arguably, under this scenario,
trademarks promote effective competition and create more dynamism in the market.
But the net result of this market dynamism is often overlooked or when it is addressed
the standard analysis is that the various trademarks, or branding of goods for that
matter, allows consumer to better identify the origin of goods and as such their welfare
is better served. I do not disagree with this analysis. However, as I will suggest below,
there is a new paradigm to trademarking activities and that is the wealth generating
paradigm.
But let us return for a moment to the example of the pink pill above as denoted by
the GRENADE trademarks. In this context, the four trademarks serve to inform the
consumer who is constantly searching for anti-obesity and dietary supplements. But
the market is competitive and there are other such supplements widely available.
However, an anti-obesity supplement as indicated by the GRENADE trademark will
give the consumer a blast so to speak, due to their qualities and or as being a first—a
market leader. Taken in this context and by implied reference to competitors in the
dietary supplements market, consumers can view trademarks’ chief role as the tool for
the promotion of competition since they are able to decipher all the necessary
information embedded in the various trademarks that represent dietary supplements.
The upshot for consumers then is their ability to choose which such dietary supplement
they prefer (for a slimmer waistline), and as such, trademarks in a general sense are in
the best interest of the consuming public due to their ability to promote competition.
And, as I argue below, in the context of product differentiation, trademark laws
responded to the promotion of competition in order to ensure that fair competition
actually exists on the market but should now navigate through the trajectories of other
laws such as antitrust law.
Even where consumers are the driving force behind trademarks promoting
competition, it does not necessarily mean that consumers themselves recognize this
phenomenon. The reason for this is not surprising because consumers often times lack
the necessary expertise in markets where they purchase goods.
Take for example, the market for slimming pills, such as those represented by the
GRENADE trademark. Most of the consumers would be those seeking to lose weight
and therefore can easily succumb to a product that advertises itself as the best in the
weight loss market. This vulnerability on the part of the consumer suggests that they
are uninformed and lack expert information on the weight loss market. Therefore,
certain branded products dictate their shopping behavior. The brand, as represented by
the trademark, although providing consumers with valuable information, steers the
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consumer in a habit of refusing to seek out other weight loss products or even to
compare weight loss products represented by the same trademark even under different
brands. One could also argue that consumers who buy only one type of weight loss
products as represented by a single trademark owner believe that switching to a
different brand, even where prices are lower, is not worth the time or effort. This
results in some consumers being uninformed of the relative economics of scale that
are available on the market for weight loss products which trademarks promote in the
broader dynamism of a competitive market. Thus, the consumer market behavior is
also crucial to trademark as a means of promoting competition because that very same
market behavior is responsible for the informed and the uninformed consumer, crucial
for trademark’s information role in competitive markets.
The crucial difference between an informed consumer and an uninformed
consumer is that the uninformed consumer remains loyal to a certain product and does
not take the time to switch or make comparisons of the variety of products available
on the market. The informed consumer on the other hand, performs these tasks
expertly, and in doing so, is able to drive competition because other trademarks
(branded goods) passed on crucial information so that he can reach out to the goods
or services offered by rivals, for example on the market for weight loss supplements,
and as such, trademarks further help to promote competition. The informed consumer
who is equipped with a wealth of information can adjust to changes in price or abandon
his usual consumption pattern in favor of other brands of the same product (weight
loss supplements) and fosters a competitive spirit that ultimately creates further
goodwill in the multiplicity of trademarks. The irony is that, on the one hand,
trademarks, while providing consumers with valuable information and driving
competition, do not convince the uninformed consumer. That consumer will remain
loyal only to certain brands. On the other, the informed consumer who embraces the
diversity of goods trademarks represents and helps to fuel growth of the market
economy. Thus, even though based on this reasoning that a market expands as a result
of trademarks there is an inherent paradox: how to change the purchasing habits of the
un-informed consumers when compare to the informed consumers.
By the time most modern trademark laws were introduced from the late 1880s,
mostly in Europe and the U.S., courts had already begun conceding that trademarks
help to promote competition and efficiency in a market and infringing trademarks can
reduce that competition and efficiency if they lead to, for example, loss in sales. In
Sykes v. Sykes,78 for instance, where the defendant allegedly marked his goods with
the same mark as that of the plaintiff’s superior mark for powder flasks and shot-belts,
an English court noted that the plaintiff enjoyed great reputation with the public and
the defendants infringing goods lead to a loss in sales for the plaintiff.79 Although the
case was that of passing off under English Common law, it recognized the protection
of trademarks and, as such, its significance was that it alerted regulators, the courts,
and the subsequent development of trademark laws, the economic impact infringement
can cause to the competitive process–and in this situation a negative one. In other

78

Sykes v. Sykes (1824) 3 B. & C. 541, 542, 107 Eng. Rep. 834 (K.B.).

79

Id.
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decisions, such as Blanchard v Hill,80 the English courts were also confronted with the
many paradoxes of trademarks, such as promoting competition, but also creating
monopolies.81 But once trademark laws were introduced from the late 1880s, and
onwards to the first half of the twentieth century, the courts were sympathetic to the
notion that trademarks promote competition or create monopolies.82
Recent courts decisions have also picked up on the notion that trademarks promote
competition, even if such trademarks are embedded as “keywords” to meet the
demands of twenty-first century advertising on electronic mediums such as the
internet. For instance, in Google France v. Louis Vuitton, the Court of Justice of
European Union (CJEU) observed in particular that “[trademark] keyword advertising
promotes competition” even in the absence of an economic link between two rivals on
the market for flowers.83 The Court was referring to the selection in “Adwords” of
keywords which correspond to trademarks, and the statement by the Court can be
interpreted as a formal admission of how crucial trademarks are to the functioning of
an integrated economy comprised of different cultural traditions under a single rubric
of market integration.84
In other markets where there is a continuous homogenous band of consumers, such
as in the U.S., courts too have linked trademarks to that of promoting competition. In
Park N’ Fly, the U.S. Supreme Court was rather succinct on how trademarks fosters
competition: “trademarks desirably promote competition and the maintenance of
product quality.”85 The fostering of competition by trademarks, the U.S. Supreme
Court explained was due to the fact trademarks are able to secure for “the producer
the benefits of good reputation.”86 The Court might have been conservative in their
references to trademarks as economic entities that foster competition and that might
have been because going beyond those conservative statements would intertwine
trademark law and protection with other areas of the law which would be more
problematic.
Putting the above arguments in perspective, one can find two particular aspects of
why trademarks’ role in promoting competition is rather appealing. The first is that of
what courts like Park N’ Fly referred to as (a) good reputation and (b) trademarks as
autonomous economic entities.87 The reputation paradigm stands at the very heart of
80 Blanchard v. Hill (1742) 2 Atk. 484 (Ch.), 26 Eng. Rep. 692, overruled by Cabrier v.
Anderson (1777) 2 Atk. 487.
81

Id.

82 Sara V. Dobb, Compulsory Trademark Licensure as a Remedy for Monopolization, 26
CATH. U. L. REV. 588, 592–93 (1977). See also Historical Encounters, supra note 1.
83 Interflora, Inc. v. Marks & Spencer PLC, [2013] EWHC 1291 (Ch) (Eng.) (citing joined
cases 236/08, 237/08 & 238/08, Google France v. Louis Vuitton, 2010 E.C.R. I-02417, which
states that “a trade mark is selected as a keyword by a competitor of the proprietor of the mark
with the aim of offering internet users an alternative to the goods or services of that proprietor.”).
84

Id.

85

Park 'n Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 193 (1985).

86

Id. at 198; Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 774 (1992).

87 Park 'n Fly, 469 U.S. at 198; Jorge V. Ramos, The Economics of Trademarks (Aug. 31,
2019) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Florida International University) (available at
http://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/etd/2231).
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trademark protection because it is the goodwill in the reputation of a trademark that
allows a proprietor to reap other incentives. Then, there is the argument that
trademarks are autonomous economic entities. This is so because of their reputation
paradigm that drives the profit of the proprietors or form the most important asset in a
firm, and, as such, trademarks can be sold, licensed or leased as a value making
property.
These two initial observations are important as they capture some of the sentiments
courts expressed in some trademark cases. Also, because both the reputation paradigm
and the autonomous entity paradigm are creators of goodwill and they indicate, in
particular, the autonomous entity paradigm that market forces associated with
trademarks are often neglected in an analytical way. But it is also these two particular
reasons why trademark law itself promotes competition because the reputation in a
trademark creates an avenue for access to the trademark, as Google France reminded
us in examples such as Adwords, or other forms of trademarks that enhances a healthy
form of competition with new entrants on the market.88 Apart from the promotion of
competition, the real purpose of trademarks, I posit, is to generate wealth for its
holders: the business of business is the actual business of trademarks.
B. The Economics of Trademarks and Their Wealth Generating Capacity
The ubiquitous nature of trademarks is a constant reminder of how signs and
symbols are agents that help to shape the social, religious and economic behavior of
human beings. Trademarks spread the gospel of goods and services, indicating their
origins and the economic wealth of the owners. Trademarks shape the behavioral
pattern of how consumers shop for goods as a trademark can indicate inferiority,
luxury, quality, or social status. As the religious symbol of global commerce,
trademarks are a source of freeriding and comparative advertising. The contemporary
instruments that regulate the protection of trademarks in national jurisdictions, such
as the Lanham Act in the U.S. or the Trademark Directive (TMD) in Europe, readily
invoke the exclusivity of trademarks.89
The exclusivity of trademarks is reinforced by the courts as any infringement
barring permission from the trademark owner is a detriment to the economic livelihood
of the trademark owner, creating mistrust in the marketplace for goods and services
among consumers. Trademark law, in its current fashion, is an instrument that serves
the market economy by promoting competition—largely by ensuring that the
reputation or goodwill in a trademark is protected90—while seemingly providing
avenues for the benefit of consumers for which trademarks, according to the current
predominant theory, reduce consumer search costs.91 Trademark law for its part has
been generally viewed as suffering perhaps from intellectual dys-functionalism given
that it is not as rich in “theoretical or practical connection” to other areas of intellectual
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property law, such as patent law or copyright law.92
Nevertheless, one intellectual discourse that trademarks have undergone in recent
years is the economics, or law and economics, approach to trademark law. Under this
approach, scholars use economic analysis to explain the purpose or function of
trademarks and the effect of economic analysis on trademark law.93 The impact of
these views has been the main stay on the intellectual discourse of trademarks with
little challenges or alternate propositions/approaches. With the exception of David
Barnes’s 2006 article,94 which largely rejected the private goods nature of trademarks
and classified trademarks as a form of public goods, and hence, suggested market
failures are “associated with the supply of trademarks and the information they provide
about products and sources of products,”95 there has been little dissent in the trademark
law literature on the economics of trademarks or positing a different economic
interpretation of trademarks. There have been notable exceptions, for example
Lunney96 who argued that trademarks still retain their inherent monopolies which
distort the competitive market and Griffiths97 who offered marketing dimension on
trademarks using economic analysis. My own attempt to pursue a new line of thinking
in the literature on the economics of trademarks looked at the case law mostly in
Europe,98 and argued that product differentiation is one aspect that could steer the
economics of trademarks in a new direction.99 I will further develop some of the
arguments on product differentiation in the final part of this Article.
If ever there was a moment to rescue or expand those arguments,100 the opportunity
is presented here in this section. I will advance this claim by proposing that the
economics of trademarks should be analyzed from their wealth generating function.
The creation of wealth is essential to the free market, both for individual human beings
and for firms that invest in trademarks used to bring goods and services to the market.
I do not reject the search costs function of trademarks as posited by Landes and
Posner,101 but my contention is that the main function of trademark cannot be watered
down to search costs. Rather, the main function of trademarks should be seen for what
they are, the generating of wealth for their owners, so that wealth can be used to either
92
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reinvest in more quality goods and services for the consumer or to generate more
upstream wealth when the ownership in the trademark is passed on. By focusing on
the wealth generating function of trademarks, I am able to not only diverge from the
search cost theory but posit that this new theory of wealth generating also reinforces
the exclusive monopolies in trademarks.
As a form of creative expression embodied in a sign that represents goods and
services, which in the form of a word, a combination of words, shapes, sounds, colors,
numbers, or other forms, a trademark represents wealth or aspirations for wealth. The
current theories of the uses of trademarks predominantly place the consumer at the
beneficial forefront by asserting that trademarks reduce consumer search costs. 102 This
view was first developed simultaneously by Landes and Posner, where the authors
asserted that trademarks reduce consumer search costs and therefore promote
efficiency in the market.103 Landes and Posner developed a model in which they
explained that the essential function of trademarks is to reduce consumer search costs
and explained in particular that “the benefits of trademarks in reducing consumer
search costs require that the producer of a trademarked good maintain consistent
quality over time and across consumers. Hence trademark protection encourages
expenditures on quality.”104 Their arguments have been attractive and trademarks
since have been relegated to that of easing shoppers’ frustration on the market. One
poignant part in the quote above is the clause which also has serious implications on
the uses of trademarks: trademark protection encourages expenditures on quality.
This little unnoticed part of their diagnosis of trademark use has generally been
ignored and, in my view, contains an exposition on the use of trademarks that suggest
trademarks have an investment function. Perhaps it was this investment function that
courts, such as L’Oreal v. Bellure, had in mind when they noted that an (additional)
function of a trademark is that of investment.105
The search cost function, which also made its way to the courts in judgments such
as Ty v. Perryman and Qualitex v. Jacobson,106 was not only attractive because of its
simplicity but because trademarks in themselves were also conceived as an economic
entity–goods themselves. Thus, people shop for goods the trademark represents and
they also shop for the trademark because the consumers have developed over a period
of time a certain consistency in shopping for the goods and the associated experience
in doing so arguably reduces their search methods. But the unique appeal of the search
cost theory that Landes and Posner developed was because of applying economic
analysis the focus shifted to the consumer.107 By doing this, the entire economic space
in which trademarks exist reinforces the nature of a market where only consumers
matter in the market and any actions sellers take, include in the form of a trademark,
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is to the benefit of the consumer.108 The seller was communicating to the consumer
the benefits and quality of his goods, the consumer need not look further when he
recognizes the seller’s mark, and the seller’s mark was in the best interest of the
consumer for economic efficiency.
In the context of the search cost theory, a consumer who prefers WONDER
GREEN PILL as the stimulant of choice to engage in physical activities, will after the
first time, be able to know exactly what he or she prefers. Therefore, upon the second
and subsequent times when shopping for stimulants, the trademark saves time, money,
energy, and other efficiency criteria when choosing stimulants that carry the
WONDER GREEN PILL trademark. In this context, the WONDER GREEN PILL
trademark acts not only as the conveyor of information about the source or quality of
the stimulant but it also enables the consumer to reduce his search costs. Under this
scenario, the search cost theory, and by and large trademark laws, created instances
where it is cheaper for the consumer to source his goods that contain certain qualities
and thereby driv competition in the market, in particular the market for stimulants,
where the WONDER GREEN PILL trademarked good is just one of the many. But
therein lies an irony: a consumer, who only relies on the WONDER GREEN PILL
without resorting to an alternative on the market, helps to create a situation in which
trademark laws act as a culprit to “entrench market dominance by leading firms and
make it harder for competitors to crack new markets.” 109 The search costs theory, as
provocative as it may be, also helps to perpetuate a crisis in trademark law, where
trademark laws must act as a balance to provide consumer protection but at the same
time ensure that trademark proprietors are shielded from undesirable elements in the
competitive market that free-ride on their marks in the quest for consumers.
Trademark laws’ crisis is inevitably the conduit that generates market power and
serves potentially for the abuse of dominant position by also ensuring that wealth
generating techniques are employed by trademark owners.
One of the main reasons why the search cost theory in modern trademark law is
predominantly the main theory that occupies both the time of scholars, and often the
courts, is because it has an intellectual foundation from a law and economics approach.
The appealing nature of modern law and economics approach to the law that was fully
developed in the 1960s and mushroomed ever since (and even with Posner by the early
1970s) had presented opportunities for other scholars to raise the search costs theory
using a non-trademark law approach, in particular advertising. This is quite interesting
because advertising, by and large, involves the use of a trademark and therefore in this
connection, the difference between advertising and trademark is superfluous. If,
arguendo, there is no difference between advertising—a conduit of information using
a trademark—and a trademark in the literal sense of the word—the search cost theory
based on advertising that was developed in some of the earlier literature is also crucial
to how we understand the modern conception of the trademark search cost theory as
posited by Landes and Posner.
There are three crucial pieces of scholarship, at least in my view, from an
advertising and information perspective, that are essential to understanding the search
cost theory in modern trademark law. The first was a 1948 piece by Ralph Brown on
108
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Advertising and the Public Interests;110 the second was a 1961 piece by George Stigler
on the Economics of Information;111 and the third was Philip Nelson’s Information
and Consumer Search Behavior in 1970.112 Certainly, based on the vast amount of
advertising literature from an economic perspective, others can add more food for
thought; however, I singled out these three pieces because of a similar connection that
Landes and Posner developed in their seminal 1987 article.113
In 1948, Brown argued that the public primarily has an interest in a competitive
market through which advertising is the cornerstone, providing that such advertising
contains information about the goods so that consumers can choose.114 Brown framed
what are arguable trademarks in the context of advertising as informative symbols,
which encompasses “the legitimate informational value of labels pointing to an
established reputation.”115 Brown viewed advertising in essentially the same way
modern trademark functions are viewed, in that, Brown insisted, “advertising has two
main functions, to inform and to persuade.”116 But the point to take away from
Brown’s discussion was the suggestion that advertising in one form may promote
“cost reductions”117 and this is important to the reduction search cost theory later
developed by Landes and Posner.118 Even where Brown may have used the term
“promoting cost reductions” in passing in reference to the possibility of advertising–
it was a poignant point because Brown’s overall discussion was that advertising serves
the public interest and any protection of trade symbols should consider the degree to
which that public interest is served by advertising, which essentially encompasses
trademarks.119
Where Brown used a law and economics discussion of advertising as a form of
promoting cost reductions by serving the public interest, it was Stigler in 1961 and
Economics of Information that fully developed the consumer search cost theory from
an economic perspective.120 Brown had insisted that the “principal reason for
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advertising is an economic one”121 and by default is the primary reason for trademarks,
which are encompassed in advertising.122 But crucially, Brown argued that one of the
main functions of advertising was an informative one. Stigler, for his part on the
informative role of advertising, argued that advertising was an efficient conduit for
transmitting information to the consumer, which would have otherwise been costly to
search for.123 In Stigler’s version of the search cost theory, information is a scarce
resource and can incur additional costs to consumers and as such, greater search costs
can result in price dispersion. Firms, Stigler argued then, use advertising to provide
consumers with information and the result of that is advertising curtails the dispersion
of prices: “price advertising has a decisive influence on the dispersion of prices. Search
now becomes extremely economical.”124 This is a direct correlation to the reduction
of search costs since advertising (functioning as trademarks) provides consumers with
information, which overall leads to price dispersion and generally lowers search costs.
In the context of the search cost theory, which is perhaps the most dominant theory on
the functions of trademark, then it can be argued that it was Stigler who first introduced
the search costs theory with advertising when read to also encompass trademarks and
not necessarily Landes and Posner.125 By using advertising as a model of optimal
economic search, Stigler was able to demonstrate that when applied to the market for
goods and services, trademarks inherently reduce consumer search costs even if
embedded in advertising.126 A similar line of argument to Stigler was also developed
by Ozga’s Imperfect Markets127 prior to Stigler’s paper, where he insisted that there
was always an informative element in all advertising.
The next relevant discussion to the search cost theory was Nelson’s 1970
contribution and later developed in Advertising as Information in 1974 in which he
also insisted that advertising equips consumers with information allowing them to
reduce payoffs.128 Building on the informative view of advertising, including the
search theory developed by Stigler (1961), Nelson posited that products with overall
quality are communicated through advertising and, where consumers behaved
rationally, they are not prone to false advertising.129 Nelson further developed the
notion of “search” and “experience” goods and argued that search goods were easily
verifiable by the consumer and experience goods were those whose quality can only
be determined once purchased.130 Nelson developed his advertising theory around this
distinction of goods and noted that advertising in experience goods is uninformative
121
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whilst advertising in search goods is informative.131 Under these scenarios, Nelson
suggested that experience goods allow consumers to detect high-quality brands
through advertising and can rely on repeat purchases.132 What ties most of this
literature on advertising to the search cost theory in trademark theory is the
interconnection of advertising and brands and how they encompass trademarks. Given
this connection of advertising to trademarks, the trademark theory of reducing
consumer search costs is not entirely novel, and to some extent, has reached its
capacity. In this regard, my proposition that the wealth generating function of
trademark is to reestablish the original function of trademarks—the business of wealth
creation.
In my view there are other allied objectives of trademarks in addition to the
consumer search costs theory developed by Landes and Posner. The most notable of
such allied objectives are indication of source and goodwill investment which help to
create greater efficiency for consumers and trademark owners alike. There is another
objective of the trademark system which registered symbols represents and this
objective of trademarks has to be analyzed from the point of view where trademarks
are seen as representing the economic interests of goods manufacturers and service
providers. In this regard, an underlying goal of a trademark is to create wealth for
goods manufacturers and service providers. This wealth generating function of a
trademark eclipses the other projected goals such as the reduction of consumer search
costs.
In more recent times, one of the attractive theories of trademarks, from an
economic perspective that has gained much attention, is that posited by David
Barnes.133 Barnes argues that trademarks should be treated as public goods given that
trademarks convey information that eventually becomes public consumption.134
According to Barnes, trademarks are a “species of public good, in particular, mixed
public goods”135 and the ultimate goal of trademark law, when juxtaposed with public
goods theory, “is to provide the optimal amount of information about products and
their sources.”136 Barnes noted that it was too simplistic to consider alone trademarks
as private goods. He posited that, when viewed from a public good perspective, there
are market failures associated with trademarks,137 typically to those associated with
131
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other areas such as patents or copyrights. In this regard, Barnes observed that: “Public
goods theory demonstrates that the market failure justifying government intervention
in the regulation of trademarks is the same as the justification for regulating copyrights
and patents.”138 Now we have to ask ourselves, are trademarks a form of public good
based on these theoretical propositions and if so, what are the implications?
The underlining premise, as Barnes argues, for trademarks being a public good, is
because of the information that a trademark conveys becomes “public” and freely
available for all to use, in the sense of those words, once a trademark is in use. 139
Barnes argues that trademarks are non-rivalrous in nature and made a linkage to the
Samuelson theorem of public goods, which states that once a good is introduced on
the market, “any given unit of the good can be made equally available to all”140 and
that trademarks under these circumstances are used referentially. Barnes posits: “Once
a supplier adopts a mark to use proprietarily and uses it in commerce, that mark is
equally available to all to use referentially.”141 Thus, non-rivalry in (trademarked)
goods presupposes that no matter if X amount of goods are consumed by Y, there
would still be a good amount for Z and so on, to consume. 142 This linkage of public
goods theory to trademark is an important one since it captured the transmission of
trademarks in an information context, and similar to copyrights or patents, that
information has become available for all to use without diminishing the opportunities
to others to use. Arguably, the public goods theory of trademarks reveals that, as
economic entities, trademark law recognizes and supports the broader wealth
generating capacity of trademarks.
Barnes’s underlying argument is that a trademark is a mixed form of public good
because the information that a trademark conveys falls into public domain due to its
informative role.143 In other words, trademarks convey information that becomes
public “once placed on the market,” if I may use a term largely applicable to
exhaustion theory in trademark law. The public goods theory of trademarks, and as
posited by Barnes, fits into the information function of trademarks, (communicative)
and similar to the search cost function of trademarks, the information function serves
the welfare of the consumers. As Barnes posited, the “source or product information
may be associated with a mark through advertising. Advertising tacks additional
information onto marks. This information is luggage that the mark carries on its travels
through the stream of commerce.”144 The information function of a trademark is
harmed by actual source confusion.” Id. at 46. For full discussion on market failure and
trademarks see id. at 57–64.
138

Id. at 35.

139

Id. at 24.

140

Id. at 35.

141

Id. at 47.

Id. (“As long as there are non-rivalrous users, as there are for trademarks viewed as mixed
public goods, the static/dynamic dilemma associated with non-rivalry remains.… Public goods
theory suggests that the provision of search information to referential users through trademarks
may be inefficient due to potential conflict between static and dynamic efficiency and
inadequate demand revelation.”).
142

143

Id. at 24.

144

Id. at 31.

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2019

27

2019]

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY FOR BREAKFAST

63

appealing because the information function of a trademark, as opposed to search cost
reduction, helps to maintain a surplus market which trademark owners in turn use to
create a market power advantage for goods on the market.
But what is truly appealing about the information function of a trademark is the
extent that it helps to cement the investment function of trademarks and thereby
creating further opportunities for wealth generating and brushing the consumer search
cost function to near irrelevance. As pointed out earlier, the function of a trademark
from a search cost point of view, is consumer oriented in that trademarks are seen as
realms of consumer efficiency and to make the consumer better off, so to speak. This
is also one sided and does not capture the function of trademarks from that of the
producer–the proprietor who sought protection for the mark in the first place. While
other functions, such as the informative (communicative), tend to represent the
economic interest of the rightsholder, I want to shift the focus to economic effect of
the investment function of trademarks, which has been gaining a foothold in recent
years, due to a ruling from the CJEU which propelled this new function of trademarks.
Naturally, one implication of a new theory regarding trademark functions is that it
highlights the resourcefulness of trademarks and at the same time sends shockwaves
through trademark jurisprudence itself.
It took a quarrel over, of all things, flowers (roses) between a high-end British
department store and an American flower distribution giant with global operations for
courts to reckon that there was another dimension to trademarks—an investment
function.145 Not that things as glowing and beautiful as nature’s gift to man–flowers–
should have been the object that determined that trademarks have an investment
function, but then again, it harks back to man as economic entity engaging in all sort
of economic activities for his benefit, whether, as early man would do–stamp his cattle
and or present homo economicus often do–branding his flowers with a special mark to
signify the scent of utopia.
It was in Interflora v. Marks & Spencer that the CJEU confirmed the existence of
an investment function of a trademark—even if that investment function “overlap[s]
with the advertising function.”146 Of course, in one respect, the court confirming the
existence of an investment function in a trademark should hardly be surprising to
trademark owners, but for the trademark legal scholarship and even the trademark
litigation world, it was a surprising decision or even one of bewilderment. 147
Nevertheless, the investment function of a trademark serves particular needs of not
only trademark law going back to basics–in that trademark law was initially for
manufacturers before it was appropriated to that of consumer interest—but also that
the investment function is a natural percolator to the wealth generating function of
trademarks.
Interestingly, what sparked the quarrel about flowers and led the court to confirm
the existence of an investment function in trademarks was the new phenomenon of
keyword advertising, where a competitor often selects the trademark of a competing
145
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brand as a keyword to advertise his own product on online services such as
Google.com. Incidentally, it was Google Inc., that developed this new method of
advertising—AdWords—for the internet (and it is a trademark headache altogether),
but nevertheless, when Marks and Spencer chose the keyword “Interflora” and various
derivatives–it triggered a backlash from Interflora Inc., who sued for trademark
infringement.148 In addition to the origin and advertising function of a trademark, the
CJEU explained that a trademark encompasses “various commercial techniques” and
if a competitor “substantially interferes with the proprietor’s use of its trade mark to
acquire or preserve a reputation capable of attracting consumers and retaining their
loyalty, the third party’s use must be regarded as adversely affecting the trade mark’s
investment function.”149 The substantial interference requirement that is available to
competitors are that of AdWords in this context, and such AdWords can determine
how consumers behave when searching for methods of delivering flowers online.
Under these circumstances, AdWords can trigger a consumer to behave differently,
either for comparison or ultimately rejecting the original trademark owner’s services
for a competitor. Although, I disagree with the argument that under similar
circumstances—and AdWords do not “trigger” trademark confusion—AdWords do
create or shape consumer behavior in trademark law. 150
The choice of words by the court reflected one thing, in particular, the phrase:
“various commercial techniques,” as it was meant to underline the all-important
economic impact of trademarks and that trademark owners ought to reap their
economic rewards from the investment in their “property.”151 The Advocate General
gave a similar reasoning in his Opinion and noted: “The property-based approach also
protects the communication, advertising and investment functions of trade marks with
a view of creating a brand with a positive image and independent economic value
(brand equity or good will).”152 This point of view essentially captured the economic
effect of the investment function because it is by simply engaging in various
commercial techniques that the proprietor invests in his mark so that it can lure
potential customers to his goods and services while at the same time creating goodwill
in reputation and increasing his “brand equity.”153 To discern the wider economic
effect of the investment functions of trademarks, one must agree that trademarks are
a form of property and once this belief is taken into account, then it is much easier to
148
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brand awareness, brand loyalty, perceived quality, and brand associations – that are attached to
a brand name or symbol.” David A. Aaker & Alexander L. Biel, Brand Equity and Advertising:
An Overview, in BRAND EQUITY & ADVERTISING: ADVERTISING’S ROLE IN BUILDING STRONG
BRANDS 2 (David A. Aaker & Alexander L. Biel eds., 1993).
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concur with the Interflora Court that trademarks serve an investment function. One
problem with that argument is that the CJEU does not necessarily share this view. If
it does, it is quite silent on the matter, which does not necessarily demonstrate that
trademarks are a form of property.154
The view that the CJEU subscribes to, as opposed to treating trademarks similarly
to property rights, is that of economic function and this spans the various rulings of
the Court over the decades that touched upon issues such as “economic link;”
“economic progress;”155 or various rhetoric infused with the word “economic.” All
these references and rhetoric by the CJEU on trademarks role and functions can be
housed under one roof as the economic function theory of (European) trademark. But
the greater implication for treating trademarks similarly to real property, despite some
hesitation by the courts in recent years, is that as a form of intellectual property
trademarks are perhaps “superior rights,”156 because I believe trademarks engage the
transactional world of goods and services more regularly as opposed to other property
and the rights in them.
Frank Schechter’s work, which has had a lasting impact on contemporary
trademark and theory, had used the term “commercial magnetism” to describe the
power and attraction of trademarks. For Schechter, who was a lead trademark counsel
for a prominent firm at the time, viewed trademarks as the source of profits for a firm
when his arguments on the rational basis for trademark protection are decoded using
the wealth generating theory.157 Similar to Schechter’s appeal of trademark’s
commercial magnetism, the wealth generating theory of trademarks reflects a firm’s
desire for profitability and control over the market the trademarked goods represent,
as evidenced by the commercial techniques trademarks employ. Viewing the functions
of trademarks as wealth generating as opposed to other functions is an attempt to
challenge the very foundation of the current system of trademarks so that internal
contraction can be made within the system to fully recognize the impact wealth
generating in trademarks has on society.
To summarize the wealth generating function of trademarks, as I posited above, is
that the trademark owner has always been a “rational maximiser of self-interest”158
and his trademarks ultimately represent those self-interests, and in one sense, the
wealth generating theory of trademarks is vindicated by the wealth maximization
154 However, in the United States, courts have often recognized that trademarks are a form of
property. See Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid, 527 U.S. 666, 673 (1999) (observing that
“protected property interest is the right to exclude others … [including] trademarks ….”); K
Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 485 U.S. 176, 186 (1988) (holding that trademark law grants private
property rights); Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 413 (1916) (noting that
trademarks “and the right to their exclusive use, are of course to be classed among property
rights.”); Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 92 (1879).
155 Case C-10/89, SA CNL-SUCAL NV v. HAG GF AG, 1990 E.C.R. I-3711, [1990] 3
C.M.L.R 571, where the AG quipped, “trade marks reward the manufacturer who consistently
produces high-quality goods and they thus stimulate economic progress.”
156

Robert Merges, A Transactional View of Property Rights, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J., 1477,
1486 (2005) (discussing patent licensing cases).
157

Schechter, supra note 17, at 831.

158

Norman Frolich et al., Beyond Economic Man: Altruism, Egalitarianism and Difference
Maximizing, 28 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 3 (1984).
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theory in general economics.
Bearing in mind the various contributions over the years on the functions and or
economic aspects of trademarks, and having discussed some of those contributions in
the preceding pages, I have come to realize that despite those unique arguments, the
real purpose and function of a trademark did not entirely reveal itself either in those
contributions and or those contributions did not properly frame the real function of a
trademark. Because a trademark is an investment by its proprietor, its chief function
is to generate wealth on behalf of that proprietor while serving as an economic link on
the competitive free market between buyers and sellers of goods and services. The
main reason why a firm or person engages in the production of goods and services is
to generate a profit and hence create more wealth for shareholders in the firm and or
for the individual economic entity (homo economicus). As the firm or individual
economic entity engages in the production of goods and services, as principal gateway
and connection to potential customers, a sign is chosen to represent those goods and
services. While that sign performs other percolator functions such as identifying the
origin of the goods and services and or reducing the amount of time a consumer uses
to search for specific goods or services, the sign that is chosen as a conduit of economic
activity linking the consumers and the firm or individual economic entity is merely to
ensure that enough wealth is generated through sales that maximizes the potential of
owners of the new sign representing the goods and services. Another way of viewing
this same argument is to draw an analogy with the CJEU’s L’Oreal v. Bellure decision
in that trademarks serve the proprietors’ best interest by allowing “financial
compensation.”159
One way of legitimizing the notion that a trademark’s main function is of wealth
generation is to look to the theories of brand and asset valuation in finance/accounting
and marketing. The finance/accounting theory of asset valuation posits that assets, and
in our case, an intellectual property asset such as a trademark (brand) that these core
assets allow for economic returns, while marketing theories of brand valuation posits
similar arguments.160 Now let’s, for the sake of argument based on the
finance/accounting and marketing theories of valuation, refer to intellectual property
rights and specifically trademarks as “intangible assets.” From a trademark
perspective, brand valuation entails the amount of money willing to be paid for the
goodwill accumulated on the marketplace.161 The proprietor on his part is mostly
concerned with the economic return that his trademark represents. It is always and will
always be about overall returns because the actual business of trademarks is to
generate business.
There are a number of factors for how a trademark functions as a wealth generating
device and these can range from the accumulation of goodwill; brand extensions;
product differentiations; and creative deception among other factors. I have touched
upon creative deception above and I will expound on product differentiation next and
159

Case C-487/07, L'Oréal SA v. Bellure NV, 2009 E.C.R. I-05185.

160
RUSSELL L. PARR, INVESTING IN INTANGIBLE ASSETS: FINDING AND PROFITING FROM
HIDDEN CORPORATE VALUE 86–98 (1991) (discussing trademarks as intangible assets and their
leveraging capabilities and as competitive barriers to entry). See also PETER J. GROVES,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THEIR VALUATION: A HANDBOOK FOR BANKERS,
COMPANIES, AND THEIR ADVISERS 128–29 (1st ed. 1997).
161

Celia Lury, Trade Mark Style as a Way of Fixing Things, in TRADE MARKS AND BRANDS:
AN INTERDISCIPLINARY CRITIQUE 217 (Lionel Bently et al. eds., 2008).
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will also allude to its role in antitrust harm.
C. Product Differentiation as Trademarking Activities
One of the most proliferous weapons available to trademark holders is that of
product differentiation where they are able to use this form of trademarking activity
to cement their market power status and by extent, create harms for consumers. One
of the claims in this Article is that product differentiation using trademarks creates
more than average market power and this market power borders on the threshold of
antitrust analysis and by extent a concern to antitrust law.162 In antitrust cases, U.S.
courts have recognized product differentiation as a method of measuring market
power. For example, in GT Sylvania, the U.S. Supreme Court observed that “product
differentiation” is one method used to measure market power.163 This is not difficult
to translate to the trademark settings where the proliferation of brands as a method of
product differentiation has been a tool of creative deception to the detriment to
consumers.
So then, what really is product differentiation,164 and how does it relate to
trademarks? Is there a connection between production differentiation and antitrust? If
so, what is the effect of this relationship from a trademark perspective? These are some
questions addressed in this section. In addition, these questions are crucial to the main
inquiry of this Article, that is, whether trademarks are a source of market power and
as such an antitrust problem. Product differentiation is a method used to differentiate
and distinguish “similar products from each other by persuasive (non-informational)
advertising and other forms of sales promotion.”165 This definition of product
differentiation is similar to one given by Judge Richard Posner, who explained that
“product differentiation is the phenomenon of purchasers’ distinguishing among
different sellers or brands of the same product.”166
Product differentiation is a tool employed using mostly trademarking activities,
such as branding or labeling, to give an impression on consumers that goods that are
162

See also Drugs, Beers and Product Differentiation, supra note 1.

163

Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 64 (1977) (White, J., concurring).

164 Richard E. Caves & Peter J. Williamson, What is Product Differentiation, Really?, 34 J.
INDUS. ECON. 113, 113 (1985); James M. Treece, Protectability of Product Differentiation: Is
and Ought Compared, 18 RUTGERS L. REV. 1019, 1020 (1964) (“The term product
differentiation is inclusive. It includes, as has been suggested, designs and configurations of
goods and their dress, as well as packaging. It also embraces symbols of origin such as
trademarks and tradenames. It goes beyond the product itself and in fact extends to the seller’s
location, to his reputation, manner and tone, and to each of the conditions which surround a
sale.” (citations omitted)).
165 Samuel A. Smith, Antitrust and the Monopoly Problem: Toward a More Relevant Legal
Analysis, 2 ANTITRUST L. & ECON. REV. 19, 38–39 (1969) (identifying brand name price
difference, concentration, vertical restraints such as rpm, exclusive dealing and territorial
restrictions, as forms of product differentiation).
166 Richard Posner, Working Paper III: Advertising and Product Differentiation, 2 ANTITRUST
L. & ECON. REV. 19, 45 (1969) (“Product differentiation … manifests itself in consumer loyalty,
is associated with product differences, trademarks, differential reputations of sellers for
reliability, promptness, answerability, etc. – and with advertising.”).

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol68/iss1/6

32

68

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68:36

physically similar are different. According to one definition:
Product differentiation can be interpreted in a strict sense to mean that,
economically . . ., even physically similar goods are not the same to the
consumer if there exist quite small variations of a qualitative nature. Such
differences need not include the exact physical make-up of the good itself;
although such factors as technical merit, finish and quality of material are, of
course, important. The differences need only exist in the circumstances
surround the sale of the good. Thus trade-names, labels, packing and retail
services are some of the factors which must, for most cases, be considered to
be a minimum part of the consumer’s assessment of a good.167
In U.S. v. Oracle Corp.,168 the court adopted a definition of product differentiation
that economists often use:
Firms in perfect competition produce homogenous product so that price is
the only variable of interest to consumers, and no firm can raise its price
above marginal cost without losing its entire market share . . . . Differentiated
products are imperfect substitutes representing as they do different features
or characteristics that appeal variously to different customers. Because no
product is a perfect substitute of another in a differentiated products market,
each seller continues to face a downward sloping demand curve. Like a pure
monopolist, the seller of a differentiated product, facing a downward sloping,
or less than perfectly elastic curve, maximizes its profits by pricing above
marginal cost.169
The analysis of differentiated products in U.S. v. Oracle was not the first time
courts have addressed the issue,170 and therefore, the approach to product
differentiation, using trademarks as a point of focus in this Article, under antitrust law,
sustains such an approach and how that approach affects intellectual property rights.
The definitions of product differentiation outlined above are from an economic
perspective.171 They are equally important and applicable to a legal definition of
product differentiation and also incorporate how other approaches to product
differentiation such as in marketing are used. The importance of these definitions of
product differentiation to trademarks is that it buttresses the argument that trademarks
are an independent economic entity and that product differentiation as a form of
trademarking activity “indicates the existence of some degree of market power since

167 Alex Hunter, Product Differentiation and Welfare Economics, 60 Q.J. ECON. 533, 533–34
(1955).
168

United States v. Oracle Corp., 331 F. Supp. 2d 1098 (N.D. Cal. 2004).

169

Id. at 1115 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).

170 United States v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956) (describing the
concepts of monopolistic competition and differentiated product markets).
171 Michael Spence, Product Differentiation and Welfare, 66 AM. ECON. REV. 407, 407 (1976)
(“Product differentiation involves a set of real economic choices because there are increasing
returns or declining average costs in the development, production, marketing and distribution
activities of firms.”).
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it gives the producer the ability to price above cost.”172 The implication of this, as one
author observed is that “every differentiated product” then has the ability “to be its
own antitrust product market” and this then raises questions of product market
definition in antitrust law. Looked at another way, a producer selling dietary
supplements under the brand/trademark GRENADE will diversify into various
supplements fulfilling other dietary functions but still carry the GRENADE trademark,
such as GRENADE BLAST, for the sake of argument. This creates either a distinct
market limited to that product, as Keyte posited, or its own antitrust product market.173
By using trademarking activities to differentiate products then producers are able to
further monopolize the product market they are in, building on the exclusivity
endowed in the trademark.
One challenge of product differentiation is developing a legal definition or
principles for what it entails. And this can turn out to be tricky, because, like most
legal problems, they are handled on a case by case basis. From the Hunter definition
of product differentiation above, we could deduce that product differentiation can
occur in different ways, and Keyte also argued that product differentiation can occur
in forms, such as single brand differentiation; branded and generic goods, products
differentiation by price, quality and consumer utility.174 Courts in the U.S. have
identified product differentiation based on some of these criteria. For example in FTC
v. Whole Foods, the court explained that price information was instrumental in
determining product differentiation: “the key to distinguishing product differentiation
from separate product markets lies in price information.”175 In terms of “separate
product markets,” interestingly the court noted that “product differentiation does not
mean different product markets.”176 This is crucial because where two food giants
merged and then also sell various products using trademarking activities such as
branding, private labels and product differentiation, in terms of antitrust law what is
important for consumers are “products that are distinguishable in [their] minds” as
oppose to “separate markets.”177
The gravity of this observation by the court holds one of the key factors into the
possible harms of product differentiation when trademarking activities are involved
and that is pricing, because consumers may ignore product markets but they do mind
how much they spend on a product for which trademarking activities convey
information. This does not mean that product differentiation is all together bad in the
eyes of antitrust law as some courts in the U.S. were keen on pointing this out. In

172 NEIL J. WILKOF & DANIEL BURKITT, TRADE MARK LICENSING ¶ 2:39 (2d ed. 2005)
(explaining that trademarks are also a good in itself noting “the trade mark no longer serves to
sell the goods, but it serves to sell itself.”); James A. Keyte, Market Definition and
Differentiated Products: The Need for a Workable Standard, 63 ANTITRUST L. J. 697, 698
(1995).
173

Keyte, supra note 172, at 698.

174

Id. at 705.

175

548 F. 3d 1028, 1056 (D.C. Cir. 2008).

176

Id. at 1055.

177

Id.
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Borden v. FTC, for instance, the Court explained that “a highly successful brand name
and product differentiation achieved through extensive advertising over the years . . .
does not create a presumption of monopoly power.”178
These various positions on product differentiation, as demonstrated by some
courts, only suggest that product differentiation is nonetheless an issue that divides
not only courts but also a complicated issue from even a trademark law perspective.
In one case where it was alleged that trademarks were being used to monopolize the
product markets for fraternity insignia and class rings, the Seventh Circuit explained
that if “a degree of substantial product differentiation”179 prices for the goods in
questions would have been affected and also noted that trademarks were being used
as a tool to “discourage[] competitors from entering the [market for fraternity
insignia’s and high school class rings].”180 In the case of Borden v. FTC, I disagree
where the court suggested that production differentiation may not altogether be a bad
thing because the reasoning did not take into consideration the negative effects of
product differentiation, and in particular, product differentiation ability to facilitate the
creation of barriers to entry.181
One of the claims I advance is that product differentiation182 is a source of
monopoly power. When I first made that argument,183 I did not elaborate on my thesis
and I have the opportunity to respond in part in this section.184 Product differentiation
178

674 F.2d 498, 511–512 (6th Cir.1982). See Stormy Clime Ltd. v. Regroup, Inc. 809 F.2d
971, 978–89 (2d Cir. 1987) (“By focusing upon hindrances to legitimate competition, the
functionality test, carefully applied, can accommodate consumer’s somewhat conflicting
interests in being assured enough product differentiation to avoid confusion as to source and in
being afforded the benefits of competition among producers.”); Sandra Co. v. FTC, 339 F. 2d
847, 857 (6th Cir. 1964) (“[S]ignificant product differentiation increases somewhat the
importance of intrabrand competition between distributors . . . product differentiation increases
the importance of successful advertising and promotion to inform the ultimate consumer of the
advantages of one differentiated product over another.”); Redwood Theatres, Inc. v. Festival
Enters., 248 Cal. Rptr. 189, 199–200 (1988); see also supra note 7 (discussing extensively
product differentiation).
179

L.G. Balfour Co. v. FTC, 442 F.2d 1, 10 (7th Cir. 1971).

180

Id. at 17.

181

Redwood Theatres, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 201.

182 Product differentiation refers to the variations within a product class that consumers view
as imperfect substitute. See Simon Anderson, Product Differentiation, in THE NEW PALGRAVE
DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS (Steven N. Durlauf & Lawrence E. Blume eds., 2d ed. 2008); see
also Michael Lovell, Product Differentiation and Market Structure, 8 W. ECON. J. 120 (1970)
(“Product differentiation offers the consumer the opportunity to select commodities closely
tailored to his individual preferences…”). See also PAUL A. SAMUELSON & WILLIAM D.
NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS 572 (13th ed. 1989) (“[A] barrier to competition arises when legal
restrictions or product differentiation reduces the number of competitors below the number that
would survive on the basis of efficient cost structure alone.”); Charles Mueller, Sources of
Monopoly Power: A Phenomenon Called ‘Product Differentiation’, 18 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 70
(1968) (“Product differentiation refers to the distinguishing or setting apart of substitute
products from each other in the minds of buyers.”).
183

Economics of Distinctiveness, supra note 1.

184

But see Drugs, Beers and Product Differentiation, supra note 1 for more elaborate
discussions.
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is a phenomenon that leads to artificial market division and therefore “differentiation
. . . leads to greater concentration and more imperfect competition.” 185 Or, as Edward
Chamberlin, puts it: “with differentiation appears monopoly, and as it proceeds further
the element of monopoly becomes greater.”186 In addition, product differentiation is a
source of market power in that new firms find it harder to enter because the monopolist
(or established firm) “produce products which by reason of past performance, brand
names, or advertising have a strong hold on the affections of the buying public.” 187
The brand names, which I use here as trademarks, since some consumers may have an
affection for these brands, and because of their loyalty, switching is either impossible,
or the brands have grown into status symbols.
Product differentiation is inextricably linked to trademarks,188 in that
manufacturers use product differentiation as a commercial technique, but have similar
traits to trademarks as source identifiers. In Miller Brewing v. Falstaff, the court
explained that differentiating “devices” were not “technically trademarks”. 189 As a
technique, product differentiation is able to separate itself from trademark rights, but
yet, invoke trademark rights for product protection. The relationship between product
differentiation, from a trademark perspective, and that of antitrust law, is that product
differentiation sets in motion a path for a manufacture to gain dominance on a relevant
market.190 The effect is that any dominance gained as a result of product differentiation
can (probably/will) lead to a price increase.191 There is also an argument to be made
185

Samuelson & Nordhaus, supra note 182, at 573. EDWARD CHAMBERLIN, THEORY OF
MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION 9 (2d ed. 1936) (“With differentiation appears monopoly, and as
it proceeds further the element of monopoly becomes greater. Where there is any degree of
differentiation whatever, each seller has an absolute monopoly of his own product, but is subject
to the competition of more or less imperfect substitutes.”).
186

EDWARD CHAMBERLIN, THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION 9 (2d ed. 1936).

187

K. E. Boulding, Barriers to New Competition: Their Character and Consequences in
Manufacturing Industries, 2 ADMIN. SCIENCE Q. 116, 117 (1957) (emphasis added).
188

Posner, supra note 166.

189

503 F. Supp. 896, 902 (D.R.I. 1980).

Barnes, supra note 94; Joseph Livermore, On Uses of a Competitor’s Trademark, 20 STAN.
L. REV. 448, 449–450 (1968) (“The economic effects of… product differentiation made possible
by trademarks [allows] the trademark proprietor… to achieve a degree of insulation from
normal competitive pressures.”). See also Smith, supra note 154, at 38 (“The monopoly power
involved [in product differentiation] in a particular industry is measured in terms of price
differential between the advertised and the unadvertised brands of comparable quality.”).
190

191 Barnes, supra note 94, at 27 (“Firms also compete by investing in ways to make their
products different from (or appear different from) competing products. By associating unique
characteristics with their marks, suppliers reap the benefits of developing and marketing if their
exclusive right to the mark is protected. Product differentiation has been described as the
foundation of rationally functioning consumer product markets because it permits suppliers to
satisfy consumers’ diverse preferences. Product differentiation can, however, lead to
dominance of product markets, higher prices, and foreclosure of would-be-competitors.
Trademark law’s conflicted relationship with product differentiation arises from the fact that
the information content of a mark may both highlight the differences between products that
satisfy different consumers and obscure similarities that might increase competition and lower
prices.” (emphasis added) (citations omitted)).
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that product differentiation has benefits for consumers, and can be viewed the same
way trademarks functions as a source identifier or to reduce search costs, product
differentiation can function the same way. This is a plausible argument. However,
when analyzing from a different perspective, product differentiation serves as a source
of market power, then harms to a consumer that product differentiation may cause are
outweighed by any benefits that product differentiation may mitigate. Product
differentiation, as a creature of fair competition, is in itself, a creature that may create
anticompetitive barriers to entry.192 The antitrust analysis of product differentiation,
thus, also turns to an antitrust analysis of trademarks and any anticompetitive harm as
a result of trademarks and product differentiation.193
There are two observable features of product differentiation that the preceding
discussion revealed. The first is that product differentiation is a tool that can promote
a healthy degree of competition,194 and the second is that product differentiation is,
ironically, also a tool to determine the extent of market power that trademarking
activities create and thereby monopolize the product market for goods and services.
V. CONCLUSION
Discussions on the intersection of trademarks and antitrust often require novel
arguments in order to align possible breaches of antitrust rules. The arguments in this
Article are only some insights into which trademarks are possibly an antitrust problem.
The notion of creative deception that I developed in the Article helped to situate how
some of the broader market dynamics used by firms may potentially provide some of
the answers. The arguments were in part theoretical and in part practical when the case
studies are factored in the discussions. Given that I also advanced a new theory of
wealth generating function for trademarks and showed that the investment function of
trademarks served as a conduit for the wealth generating capacity of trademarks, I
suspect not all will be convinced. However, the implications are that there is a potential
new ground to consider when courts are examining antitrust cases that involved
trademarks and alleged monopolistic behavior. Moreover, since I also argued that the
traditional search cost function of trademarks has been unfairly elevated without
giving due consideration to the original function of trademarks— business and wealth
creation—then, there are grounds to further investigate the implication of wealth
creation by firms using trademarks on the competitive market. Another argument I
developed was that trademarks pursue a dual function to promote competition and, at
the same time, serve as a source of market power. These opposites also serve to
confirm the near impossibility of correctly positioning trademarks in the antitrust
framework. I hope these arguments can only further drive the debate.

192 JULES STUYCK, PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION: THE LEGAL SITUATION 107 (1983) (“Product
differentiation, the creation of objective or subjective differences between products within the
range of one or several concerns, has given rise to anxiety as to the consequences it may have
for the freedom of competitors to compete (barriers to entry), the structure of the market
(concentrations) and the transparency of the market.”).
193

See Drugs, Beers and Product Differentiation, supra note 1.

194 Similar observation was made in United States v. Wilson Sporting Goods Co., 288 F. Supp.
543, 553 (N.D. Ill. 1968) (“[C]ompetition is based only partially on price because of product
differentiation, there has remained a relatively healthy degree of product competition”).
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